t h e first In March 1 9 9 6 ,~ in a far northeastern village,3 a baboon, taken to be a witch in disguise, was killed by "necklacing," the infamous way in which collaborators were dealt with during the late apartheid years. Baboons have long been thought of as potential witch familiar^;^ indeed, a state commission recently referred to them as "professor(s) of witchcraft" (Ralushai et al. 1996:22; see below) . The animal in question "was huge . . . and was carrying a plastic
[shopping] bag1'-this last object was suspect since it signaled an all-too-human capacity to transact and transport ill-gotten goods. Said the woman who set off the alarm, "There was definitely witchcraft here. Just look at how long [the beast] took to catch alight and at how small its body i s now that we have . . . killed it." the second "Is It a Duck? No, It's the Howick Monster," wrote Ellis Mnyandu on June 10 of the same year.5 Curious crowds are visiting the Howick Falls, in KwaZulu-Natal, to glimpse a mysterious 25-foot creature. Absolom Dlamini has not actually caught sight of it yet. But, he says, there i s "a fearsome spirit here which makes you feel like you are being dragged [in. It] proves there i s a monster down there." Bob Teeney, a white businessman-aficionados of the fantastic, in this New Age, form a rainbow coalition-claims to have seen it. He also claims to have photographs (taken by a tourist) of mom, pop, and baby monsters. He argues that they belong to "an aquatic, snake-like dinosaur family known as Plesiosaur." These beasts, say scientists, have been extinct for six million years, give or take a million, and they never lived in fresh water to begin with. A local anthropologist, also disappointingly matter-of-fact, has opined that there is nothing there at all, that the story recuperates an old Zulu myth about a water serpent.6 Science (and ethnographic authority) aside, people have flocked to the place. If nothing else, this has promoted local commerce, including the sale of likenesses. One sculptor, a crippled craftsman from Zaire, has become a convert. "First I believe in Cod and then the monsters," he says. "I am making more money than I used to. I call it monster-money." the t h i r d Since 1994 , notes Lumkile ~o n d i , ' t h e r e has been an explosion of pyramid saving schemes in the countryside-some of them founded by old antiapartheid activists, now "development entrepreneurs," to deal with the destitution of rural blacks. These schemes undertake to pay three times the initial stake, depending for their viability on ever more people signing on. But many investors were not taking their money at maturity, waiting rather to cash in huge sums later on. ' Mondi says that the management of one scheme found itself with R 46m ($9.2 million), more than it could handle. So it asked a team of authorities-including Mondi himself-to intervene under the Bank Act. Mondi goes on to say that he had been manning a toll-free line to answer investors' questions; also to investigate the "fetishism [of] money and problems of accumulation in rural households." The callers had disconcerted him: he was accused of selling out to "the Boers" by abetting government efforts to subvert local economic initiatives, even threatened with necklacing. Apartheid, they told him, had made them desperately poor. And the postcolonial state had not helped. In the upshot, "Cod brought the scheme to them and changed their ~i v e s . "~ Similar schemes are also rampant in white South Africa at present, despite the regulatory efforts of the Business Practices Board and Internal ~evenue." One, unsubtly entitled "Rainbow," demands a R 10,000 stake and i s run in great secrecy by an anonymous cabal with a Liverpool address. It i s said to "conduct [meetings] with an almost religious fewour" and to threaten anyone who divulges the nature of its practices. the fourth Johannesburg, April 29, 1996 . A 38-year-old man is arrested in a shopping mall after "trying to sell a pair of blue eyes."" This incident, wrote the Star, the city's largest circulation paper, "might be linked to the murder of street children for . . . traditional medicines." Body parts, it added, were regularly used in potions for fertility, for success in business, and for luck in love. Those of white children fetched the best prices. This tale of an occultist in the economy of the occult is not unusual. The local press has been full of such cases, and courts have been kept fairly busy trying those accused of disemboweling their victims, often babies and youths, and either retailing organs in the market in viscera or using them for their own nefarious ends.I2 Not only body parts are used; so, too, are whole persons. Witches are said to bring the dead back to life so that they might work for their necromantic masters. Thus, in KwaZulu-Natal, some two years ago, the kin of 11 children killed in a bus crash, allegedly caused by magical intervention, refused to allow them to be buried because "witches [had] abducted them after bringing them back to life."13 The bodies in the mortuary, which they had identified earlier, were no longer those of the people they knew. Soon after, an old woman, suspected of the evil, was dragged from her home and killed by schoolmates of the deceased, who, in turn, were jailed.
These fragments may appear lurid, even salacious, from the cool distance of Academia Americana. In their own context, they are not that at all. Each of them, moreover, has parallels elsewhere: those parts of Europe and the United States beyond the ivory tower, the parts in which ordinary people live, produce their own fair share of the fantastic (Comaroff 1994; Comaroff and Comaroff 1993; cf. Geschiere in press ). The Howick Monster evokes not only its Loch Ness prequel, which it i s said to resemble. It also resonates with celluloid cosmologies of the Jurassic kind, making a mammoth montage of the Spielberg mindscape, the Scottish landscape, and Zulu mythology-all the while tapping into an increasing obsession with the return of extinct creatures of sub-yet superhuman potency; note here Mitchell's (1998) interesting thesis that the dinosaur i s the new American totem. The Leviathan of Natal belongs to a planetary species whose existence conflates the virtual with the veritable, the cinematic with the scientific, gods with godzillas, the prophetic with the profitable.
Likewise, the pyramid schemes, schemes that put a con in economics. These recall the ten or so whose crash sparked the Albanian revolution early in 1997.14 They also bring to mind other scams and stratagems, different yet similar, that flow from a promiscuous mix of scarcity and deregulation.I5 Such schemes-a few legal, many illegal, some alegal-are springing up all over the place, especially in postrevolutionary societies. Often registered at addresses halfway across the earth from the site of their local operation, they escapecontrol by insinuating themselves into the slipstream of the global economy.16 These schemes cover a wide gamut, from familiar forms of chain letter, through national lotteries and offshore (or on reservation) gambling, to aggressively speculative investment in the stock markets of the world, now heavily into global funds, which has led to an upsurge of "pump and dump" swindles (Eaton 1997) .17 All of these things have a single common denominator, "the magical allure of making money from nothing" (Andrews 1 997).18 Like efforts to weave gold from straw, an alchemy associated with an earlier transition in the economic history of Europe (Schneider 1989) , they promise to deliver almost preternatural profits, to yield wealth sans perceptible production, value sans visible effort. In its all-conquering, millennia1 moment, it appears, capitalism has an effewescent new spirit-a magical, neo-Protestant zeitgeist-welling up close to its core.Iq Take, for example, the Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, an American pyramid scheme created "to change the world for the glory of God," which persuaded 500 nonprofit organizations, Christian colleges, and Ivy League universities to invest $354 million; this on the promise of doubling their money in six months (Chicago Tribune 1 997).20 SO much for rational economics. And for the disenchantment of modernity.
Neither are the narratives of witchcraft, body parts, zombies, and the brutalization of children-in which generational antagonisms and curious creatures like the baboon-witch are recurrent motifs-uniquely South African. Everywhere the boundaries of postenlightenment humanity are called more and more into question; hence the fascination with cyborgs, the fear of invasion by aliens clothed in humdrum bodily form, the dangerous promise of cloning and genetic mutation. And from everywhere come stories of not-quite-human transactions in the corporeal. Postcolonial Africa i s repletewith accounts ofthe way in which the rich and powerful use monstrous means and freakish familiars to appropriate the life force of their lesser compatriots in orderto strengthen themselves orto satisfy consuming passion^.^' Similarly, Latin America has, throughout the 1990s, witnessed mass panics about the theft and sale, by unscrupulous gringos, of the organs of infants and youths (see, e.g., Scheper-Hughes 1 996).22 There, and in other parts of the world, this traffic-like the international commerce in adoption and mail-order matrimony-is seen as a new form of imperialism, the affluent West siphoning off the essence, even appropriating the offspring, of impoverished Others for ends both occult and ordinary (see below). All of which gives ample evidence, to those at the nether end of the planetary distribution of wealth, of the workings of insidious forces, of potent magical technologies and mysterious modes of accumulation, of sorcery of one or another sort. That evidence reaches into the heart of Europe itselk note the recent scares there about the satanic abuse of children (La Fontaine 1 997);23 note also reports in British broadsheets of a transnational trade in people, again particularly young people.24 In 1997, for example, The Guardian carried a report about the self-styled Sado Hangman and the Leatherwitch arraigned in Berlin for offering Czech girls, on the net, to be used in torture, sexual slavery, or whatever-pick-up and disposal of bodies inclusive-at D M 15,000 each (Staunton 1997) . This case i s neither fanciful nor singular.25 It reached the Bavarian courts, one of a number of such incidents, many of them implicating the worldwide web, that are leaving the pages of the yellow press and entering into the arena of serious social concern.
Precisely because they are at once profoundly parochial and so obviously translocal, these fragments, and innumerable others like them, raise the same conundrums, all of them distilling down to one order of question. Why now? Why now does there appear to be a dramatic intensification-none of these things is new, of c 0 u r s e~~4 f appeals to enchantment, to the use of the bodies of some for the empowerment of others (cf. Geschiere in press)? Why now the acute moral panics? What, if anything, has any of this to do with processes of globalization and the forms of capitalism associated with it? With postcoloniality? Or with the sociology of postrevolutionary social worlds? W e pose the problem both as a general matter of anthropological concern and, more specifically, of contemporary South Africa. Is it not extraordinary, for example, that the thoroughly modernist African National Congress (ANC) saw it necessary, among its first gestures in government, to appoint a commission of inquiry into witchcraft and ritual murder in one of the new provinces (Ralushai et al. 1996) ? That it found itself presiding over an epidemic of mystical evil? That this epidemic, far from abating with the end of apartheid, i s on the increaseZ2' That, according to the head of the Occult-Related Crimes Unit of the South African Police Services-itself a curious creature-the devil actually seems to be making a "revolutionary re-appearance" here? 28 Finally, what might these things have to do with the memory of Max Gluckman? O r with the present and future of the discipline of anthropology, about which he had such strong ideas? As we shall see, they challenge us with the problem of doing ethnography on an awkward scale, neither unambiguously "local" nor obviously "globalu-but on a scale in between that, somehow, captures their mutual determinations. And their indeterminacies.
Let us take the last question first. Our memories of Max Gluckman go back to the early 1970s, toward the start of our professional careers, toward the end of his. W e came to Manchester, to the famous Department of Anthropology founded by him in 1949, having read a great deal of his work-and not a few critiques (see, e.g., Tambiah 1 966).29 None of this, however, prepared us for our encounter with charisma, Mancunian-style. O r with conflict structural-functionalism as propounded, in the flesh, by Gluckman himself, a formidable interlocutor if there ever was one. Maxism, it i s true, was not Marxism; very much a creature of their day, and much less influential, many of the founding principles of the "Manchester School" are now dated (for an overview, see Werbner 1984) . But they were essayed with vigor, certitude, and a bold sense of possibility. Anthropology, for Gluckman, was both a mission and an invitation to an argument; though, in point of fact, he was always easier to argue with when not actually present. His combative, creative spirit lives on, in our consciousness, for two things above all else. It is these that provide our mandate here.
One was his-mphatically prepostmodern-insistence on discerning design in, on abstracting order from, an "illogical assortment" of disparate details, minutiae, even trivia (Gluckman 1963:l) ; his introduction to Order and Rebellion (1 963) notes, with approval, how a coherent anthropology grew out of "the study of oddments by eccentric^."^^ Gluckman, of course, was not lacking in oddness or eccentricity himself. And coherence i s not valued all that much anymore. But so be it. The serious, if simple, corollary is that our skills and sensibilities ought to be put to the effort of detecting emergent social processes and patterns from diverse, discordant acts and facts; that the sacred charter of the discipline i s to explain the existence of such partly obscured, barely audible, often nascent phenomena in the world. Sometimes these phenomena, like the unruly events so memorably described in Cluckman's Analysis o f a Social Situation in Modern Zululand (1 9401, bring into sharp focus, and serve to bridge, cultural and material forces of dramatically different magnitude or scale; as they do, they compel us to address the evanescent, ever-present connections between local concerns and world-historical movements. Herein, in this challenge, lies the essential distillate of the Gluckman heritage.
The second thing i s more specific. Max Gluckman i s justifiably famed for his work in legal anthropology, for his studies of political and social processes, and the like. Amidst his lesser-quoted essays, however, i s one that warrants special attention today. Entitled "The Magic of Despair" (see n. 1 ), it tries to make sense of the ritual practices of Mau Mau. Not only that. Those practices are run up against Central African witchcraft movements (Richards 19351 , millennia1 cults of the middle ages (Cohn 19571 , Melanesian cargo cults (Worsley 19571 , Zionist prophets in South Africa (Sundkler 1961) , and various forms of social banditry (Hobsbawm 1959) . What is the point? To explain why Africans should seek recoursetotheoccuIt in situations of rapid social transformation, under historical conditions that yield an ambiguous mix of possibility and powerlessness, of desire and despair, of mass joblessness and hunger amidst the accumulation, by some, of great amounts of new wealth (1963:3-4) . These circumstances, added Gluckman (1959:145) presciently, do not elicit a "reversion to pagan ritual." Just the opposite. "New situations," he says, citing Evans-Pritchard (1 937:513), "demand new magic"; hence the epigraph at the head of this essay.
Put these various pieces together-Gluckman's concern to decipher patterns-in-the-making from oddments and fragments, his insistence on seeing connections among phenomena of widely different scale, his interest in creative responses to contradictory historical situationsand the argument of this essay begins to take shape. So, too, do our answers to the Big Questions.
The essence of our narrative, if we may sketch it out in a few bold lines, goes like this. The Howick monster and the pyramid schemes, the epidemic of witchcraft and the killing of those suspected of magical evil, moral panics about the piracy of body parts; all are, alike, symptoms of an occult economy waxing behind the civil surfaces of the "new" South A f r i~a .~' Drawing on cultural elements with long indigenous histories, this economy i s itself an integral feature of millennia1 capitalism-that odd fusion of the modern and the postmodern, of hope and hopelessness, of utility and futility, of promise and its perversions. Its roots, we have already hinted, do not lie simply in poverty or material deprivation, however cruel and unrelenting it may be. They are to be found, rather, in a doubling, the very doubling spoken of by Gluckman in "The Magic of Despair." O n the one hand i s a perception, authenticated by glimpses of the newspapers and magazines advertise "dial-in-diviners." The public, multimediated quality of this communication i s neatly captured in innovative ritual technologies (see n. 63). One is divining by "mirror" or "television," recently developed in the Northern Province (Ralushai et al. 1996:6, 148, 177 ). An electronic update of such long-standing practices as reading oracular designs in a water bowl (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997:97-981 , this procedure requires that clients visit a "screenroom," in which they imbibe a fermented drink and watch a white cloth mounted on a
Figures of miscreants, both human and bestial, take shape on the screen; their transmission and appearance mimic the manner in which satellite dishes, broadcast networks, and long-distance magic condense images, objects, and sounds from afar.40 While the adept might assist in unscrambling the ethereal pictures, these are received directly by his customers, who sit in the archetypal posture of family viewing and listening.
Who are the protagonists in these theaters ofthe banal, these mundane magical dramas? W h o are the witches? And who takes responsibility for killing them? According to the witchcraft commission, "In general the community is responsible . . . but the youth who are called 'comrades' are in the forefront. Note: ages o f the accused ranges [sic] between 14-38 years" (Ralushai et al. 1996:15 , emphasis in ~r i g i n a l ) .~' Not only were young men the most identifiable perpetrators of witch-related violence, but they seem often to have forced neighbors and ritual experts to do their bidding. The purported malevolents, on the other hand, were the usual suspects of African witchcraft-men and women of conspicuous, unshared wealth (Ralushai et al. 1996:219, 253 )-although those who were physically attacked were overwhelmingly old and, often, socially isolated and defenseless.
Let us take a closer look at the most extended case recorded by the witchcraft commission, the Ha-Madura Witch-Hunt (Ralushai et al. 1996:193-1 98) .42 The defendants, who ranged from 14 to 35, were charged with having murdered an elderly woman, one Nyamavholisa Madura, by necklacing. They were also accused of attacking two others, both of advanced age. Witnesses recounted that, late in the afternoon of March 21, 1990, "the majority of the youths" of Madura-most of them male, most of them lacking regular work, most of them with time on their hands-gathered under a tree near the primary school. After a couple of speakers had urged them to exterminate the witches in their midst (Ralushai et al. 1996:202) , they went off along the road in search of suspects, the accused at the head. Neither of their first two intended victims was home, so they torched their property and assaulted a man suspected of raising the alarm. They then moved on to the yard of the deceased. When they found her, they doused her with petrol and set her alight. She fled across her maize field and crawled through a fence, where the crowd, wielding sticks and stones, caught up with her. "Why are you killing me, my grandchildren?" she wailed. Her assailants responded, "Die, die you witch. W e can't get work because of you!" (Ralushai et al. 1996:206,212) . Garlanding herwith a rubbertire, they applied more petrol and ignited her one final time.
There could hardly be a more bald statement of intergenerational antagonism. For these rural youth, "mass action" might have delivered the vote. But it brought them no nearerto the wealth and empowerment that the overthrow of apartheid was supposed to yield. Instead, it brought quite the reverse. Trade sanctions had increased unemployment sharply, especially in the countryside. The bitter irony of South Africa is that, as one of the world's last colonies, it won its right to secular modern nationhood just as global processes were compromising the sovereignty and material integrity of the nation-state, sui generis. Multinational capital is capricious, its patronage shifting: once apartheid had ended, it found cheaper, more tractable labor, and less violence, elsewhere. As a result, many corporations did not return and money flowed in other directions. What is more, alterations in the world economy during the 1990s-the dramatic rise of tourism and post-Fordist production, of the entertainment industry, the electronic market place, and new-age commerce-have made few inroads into the "backveld." They engage uneasily, or not at all, with rural enterprise and are experienced primarily as stories from the city or as traces on television screens. The new era, it is true, has raised the living standards for sections of the African middle class (cf. Adam et al. 1998 ). Very visibly. But, overall, work i s harder to come by and poverty i s still dire.
It i s no coincidence that the most spirited witch finding occurs where conditions are most straitened43 and, also, where raw inequality has become most blatant. The North is, aggregately, the poorest province in the country (see Davidson 1994) , and the remote regions of the Northwest come not far behind; the much heralded Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP), far from being a postcolonial panacea for poverty, has had little impact here (cf. Adam et al. 1998) . Agriculture, much of it on a pitiably modest scale, continues to be practiced, largely by women and, to a lesser extent, by older men. Petty business-beer-brewing, sex work, woodcutting, leather craft, thatching, carpentry, refashioning the detritus of used-up commodities for resale-supplements many household budgets. O n the other hand, the migrant wages that had long subsidized falteringagrarian endeavors, and had granted young males a modicum of autonomy, are now diminishing. Concomitantly, cash assets vested in the elderly, like pensions, have risen in relative value; as disposable income, they arethe object of fierce jealousy and mystical activity (cf. Ritchken 1994:357, 361 ). In addition, the establishment of the ethnic "homelands" under apartheid facilitated and funded the emergence of small new elites set apart by their evident prosperity and conspicuous consumption. And so, in towns like Madura, new material distinctions, of widely variable magnitude, have become discernible among neighbors. Such differences are made incarnate, personified even, in prized commodities: in houses, automobiles, televisions, cell phones. Said one man, Abraham Maharala, a pensioner forced to flee his village by evil-seeking neighbors, "The trouble began with the arrival of a radio."44 The alleged witch of Madura was the occasional employer of several of her attackers, and sometimes let them watch her television (Ralushai et al. 1996:212) . The petrol that consumed her was seized from the few local men who could afford cars.
There is, in short, a good deal of evidence-both from the Report and from our own observations in the Northwest in 1994-96--of widespread anxiety about the production and reproduction of wealth, an anxiety that frequently translates into bitter generational opposition. Witch-hunting youth in the Northern Province acted as a cohort, much like an age-regiment (mophato) in Sotho-Tswana society of old. Ridding the countryside of witches (balorl was all of a piece with the other forms of "mass action" that had sought to subvert an oppressive social order; not long ago, it should be noted, urban "comrades" denounced their parental generation as passive sellouts to colonial oppression. Indeed, the war against mystical evil fused, in a synthetic set of practices, political and ritual means of both recent and older vintage. In addition to singing songs of freedom as they carried out their exorcisms (Ralushai et al. 1996) , "comrades" in Venda and Giyani also intoned one of the best known local circumcision chants, a chant also associated with soccer matches, drinking parties, and other sites of male age-grade formation (Ralushai et al. 1996:50, 179, 244) .
Age, of course, is a relational principle. The youthful comrades forged their assertive identity against the foil of a sinister, secretive, gendered gerontocracy; significantly, those attacked were referred to as "old ladies," even when they were men (Ralushai et al. 1996:211) . The antisocial greed of these predators was epitomized in the idea of unnatural production and reproduction, in images of debauched, ungenerative sexuality, of adultery, rape, and abortion (cf. Ritchken 1994:325, 363) . The commission, for example, makes repeated reference to the inability of witches to bear natural children, to their red vaginas, and to their lethal, "rotten" sperm (Ralushai et al. 1996:141, 150, 158, 168) . Attacks upon them were accompanied by the cursing of their genitalia, and sometimes those oftheir mothers or their offspring (Ralushai et al. 1996:139, 144, 155, 158) . Killing these "perverts" by fire-itself a vehicle of simultaneous destruction and rebirth-bespoke the effort to engender a more propitious, socially constructive, mode of reproduction.
Threats to local viability, as we have said before, were also attributed to the creation of a zombie work force. Thus one finds the following fragment from a case record:
On a certain day [when] the accused arrived, [people] shouted from the street that she is a witch with a shrinked [sic] vagina. They further said that she had killed people by means of lightning and that she has a drum full of zombies. They also said that her son "Zero" has no male seed and that he could not impregnate a woman. [Ralushai et al. 1996 [Ralushai et al. :50, 1581 It i s hard to imagine a more pointed portrait of perversion of the zero-sum economy of witchcraft and its negation of life-giving material, sexual, and social exchange. In place of fertile procreation, and the forms of wealth that benefit a wider community, the witch makes ghost workers out of the able-bodied. She thrives by cannibalizing others, robbing the rising generation of a legitimate income and the wherewithal to marry orto establish their own families indeed, of becoming fully adult.
Precisely this sense of illegitimate production and reproduction pervades youthful discourses of witchcraft in much of South Africa. Many young black men, their masculinity ever more at risk,45 blame their incapacity to ensure a future for themselves on an all-consuming, aged elite. Their concern i s underscored by the preoccupation with zombies (sing., setlotlwane, Northern Sotho; sethotsela, Tswana). Long a feature of Caribbean vodoun but relatively new in Africa (Geschiere 1997, in press ), their appearance here owes much to a diasporic flow of occult images (Appadurai 1990 ) although they resonate with an indigenous affliction known as sefifi, a state of "living death" or social nonbeing first described by 19th-century missionaries among Southern Tswana (see also Comaroff and Comaroff 1991:143) . Spliced into local mystical economies, these shadowy figures take on the color oftheir surroundings. As one of our opening fragments suggests, they are persons who are thought to have been killed and revived by ~i t c h c r a f t .~The living dead exist only to serve their creators, generally, in the South African context, unrelated neighbor^.^' Bereft of tongues to give voice to their affliction, they are believed to workafter dark, mainly in agriculture (Ralushai et al. 1996:5; cf. Ritchken 1994:329) ; a woman suspected of profiting from phantom labor was accused, for example, of having a "tractor that makes a lot of noise during the night" (Ralushai et al. 1996:166) . Ghost workers can also be magically transported to urban centers; in fact, to any place where they might accrue riches for their owners. In this era of increasingly impermanent employment, there are even "part-time zombies" (Ralushai et al. 1996:224-225) : people who wake up exhausted in the morning, having served unwittingly in the nocturnal economy to feed the greed of a malign master.
Although they have no tongues, zombies speak of a particular time and place. The end of apartheid was partly the product of a global moment, one in which the machinations of multinational capital and the fall of the Soviet Union had drastically restructured older polarities. When black South Africans at last threw off their colonial constraints, much of the rest of the continent had learned the harsh truth about the postcolonial predicament, having experienced unprecedented marginalization and economic hardship or, at the very least, striking new distinctions of wealth and privation. Such conditions disrupt grand narratives of progress and development (Roitman n.d.:20; cf. Comaroff 1994) . But they do not necessarily dispel their animating desires; to the contrary, they may feed them. Hence the situation that Roitman (n.d.:20), writing of the Cameroon, describes as "negotiat[ing] modernity in a time of austerity." In these circumstances, there tends to be an expansion both in techniques of producing value and in the meaning of wealth itself. It is an expansion that often breaks the conventional bounds of legality, making crime, as well as magic, a mode of production open to those who lack other resources. This i s why violence, as an instrument of income redistribution, is such a ubiquitous feature of postcolonial economies, in Africa and beyond.
The zombie i s the nightmare citizen of this parallel, refracted modernity. Reduced from humanity to raw labor power, he i s the creature of his maker, stored up in petrol drums or sheds occult economies a n d t h e violence of abstractionlike tools. His absent presence suggests a link to otherwise inexplicable accumulation. Being solely for the benefit of its owner, the toil of the living dead is pure surplus value (Marx 1976:325) : it has "all the charms of something created out of nothing." Zombie production is thus an apt image of the inflating occult economies of postcolonial Africa, of their ever more brutal forms of extraction. As spectral capital, it will be evident why these forms of extraction are typically associated, as i s witchcraft in general, with older people of apparent affluence-and why zombies are thought to have multiplied as wage work has become scarce among the young and unskilled. Not only does the rise of a phantom proletariat consume the life force of others, it also destroys the labor market, conventional patterns of social reproduction, and the legitimate prospects of "the community" at large. This, in essence, was the point made by striking workers on an Eastern Transvaal coffee plantation in 1995: they demanded the dismissal of three supervisors accused of killing employees to gain control of their jobs and, even worse, of keeping zombies for their private e n r i~h m e n t .~~ But zombie production is merely one means among several. Recall that there has also been an increase in the incidence of so-called "ritual murder," of killing forthe purposeof harvesting body parts-hence our opening fragment about eyes for sale in a Johannesburg shopping mall. As Ralushai et al. explain:
These body parts are used for the preparation of magic potions. Parts of the body may be used to secure certain advantages from the ancestors. A skull may, for instance, be built into the foundation of a new building to ensure a good business, or a brew containing human parts may be buried where it will ensure a good harvest. [I 996:255] A victim's hands are "symbols of possession." Eyes imply vision, genitals imply fertility. As we know from elsewhere in South Africa, avaricious people are thought to enhance their own vigor by draining the vitality diffused in the organs of others, preferably cut out while the body i s still warm (Ralushai et al. 1996 :271 )49-and, best of all, if taken from children under 1 2.50
While they have long been part of the ritual repertoire of indigenous southern African societies, these practices appear to have been relatively rare in the past (Le Roux in Ralushai et al. 1996:255; Schapera, personal communication, August 22, 1997) . But now a great deal of ghastly evidence confirms that, in this domain too, market forces have stimulated production. In addition to horrifying accounts of mutilated remains, newspapers publish the going rate for various parts: R 5,000 for testicles or gallbladders, R 1,000 for a kidney, R 2,000 for a heart ($1 = R 4.90).51 Ordinary people, as we discovered in the Northwest in 1996, are obsessed with such minutiae; also with tales of butchered bodies turning up in places where they look just like raw meat. Hence the popular preoccupation-part fear, part fascination-with those corpses in the freezer of the Mmabatho casino (Ralushai et al. 1996) and with any number of other, equally murky stories.
This commerce seems to be eroding conventional social, cultural, and moral margins; in December 1994, a white policeman was charged with having removed the insides of a cadaver at the Braamfontein state mortuary in Johannesburg for retailing as medicine.52 Meanwhile, in different regions of the country, two young couples, both jobless and expecting babies, confessed in court to slaying young girls for their organs-in order to make ends meet.53 In each case, an older male ritual practitioner was implicated. These young people acted on the understanding that the occult economy feeds the malevolent ambitions of their elders, to whom the purloined parts were to be retailed: already in 1988 it was noted that, in the Northern Province, any disappearance of persons, especially children, was "immediately linked to businessmen and politicians" by young activists (Ralushai et al. 1996:271) . It was consternation about a string of such killings in the former homeland of Venda that caused its government to fall in the same year;54 while, across the border at Mochudi, Botswana, public discontent over the handling of a girl's ritual murder in 1994-allegedly by local entrepreneurs, abetted by her father, who testified to having "given her up" for P 1200 ($31 0)-brought youth onto the streets of the capital, prompting the Office of the President to call in Scotland Yard to help solve the crime (Durham 1998:5; Deborah Durham, personal communication, February 24, 1 998) .j5
We reiterate yet again that the traffic in human organs i s neither new nor restricted to South Africa; that there is now a global economy in body parts (see e.g. Frow 1997; Scheper-Hughes 1996; White 1997:334) , which flow from poor to rich countries, from south to north, east to west, young to old (Ralushai et al. 1996) ; that some national governments are widely rumored to raise revenue by farming corneas and kidneys for export; that, from the Andes through Africa to East Asia, mysterious malevolents are believed to extract blood, fat, members, and living offspring from the unsuspecting. At issue in these panics about corporeal free enterprise i s a fear of the creeping commodification of life itself. Among Sotho and Tswana, people speak ever more apprehensively of a relentless process that erodes the inalienable humanity of persons and renders them susceptible as never before to the long reach of the market.
Notice the emphasis on distance. The translocal dimension of dealings in the occult economy i s crucial to the way in which its workings are understood in rural South Africa. Throughout the northerly provinces, people ponder the interplay of mobility and compression in the production of new forms of wealth. These forms appear to be a consequence of the capacity to siphon goods, people, and images across space in no time at all. By what means and through what vectors? Movement, especially instant movement, adds value. But how? How are its mechanics to be mastered? How are they to be harnessed to prevailing patterns of local production and exchange? How, to use the idiom of an earlier era, i s it possible to make cargo planes from far away places land on nearby runways? As South Africa casts off its pariah status and seeks ever greater integration with world markets, the growing velocity of long-range transaction--of the almost instantaneous flow of signs and styles and commodities across the earth-is discernible all around; it i s legible in logos on T-shirts and song lyrics, in sitcoms and street-smart television series, in mass-mediated advertisements. In the rural Northwest, as we observed earlier, its impact i s traceable in, among other things, the fast-growing interest in Satanism-which i s manifesting itself as a feature of the millennia1 moment everywhere, from the east coast of Africa to the west coast of America (La Fontaine 1997; Wright 1993; cf. Meyer 1 995) .56
Once more, however, a planetary phenomenon takes on a strikingly particular local form. Among rural Tswana, discourses of the diabolical center widely, if not exclusively, upon the most recent in a long line of missions from "overseas," the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus) of Brazil (Ralushai et al. 1996) . Highly controversial in its country of origin, this new Protestant denomination-which i s rumored to issue charmed credit cards that register no debt-promises instant goods and gratification to those who embrace Christ and denounce Satan;57 but, as the local pastor put it, believers have also to "make their faith practical" by publicly "sacrificing" as much cash as they can to the movement. Here Pentecostalism meets neoliberal enterprise: the chapel is, literally, a storefront in a shopping precinct. It holds services for all manner of passersby during business hours, appealing frankly to mercenary motives, mostly among the young. Tabloids in its windows feature radiant, well-clad witnesses, from all over central and southern Africa, speaking of the gainful employment, health, and wealth that followed their entry into the Church; eloquent testimonies, these, to rapid material returns on a limited spiritual investment. The ability to deliver in the here and now, again a potent form of space-time compression, is given as the measure of a truly global God. Bold color advertisements for BMWs and lottery winnings adorn the altar, under the legend: "Delight in the Lord and he will give you the desires of your heart" (Psalms 37:4). The immediacy of this, of religion at its most robustly concrete, resonates with a pragmatic strain long evident in black Christianity in South Africa (Comaroff and Comarofi 1997:ch. 2) .
But, for those middle-class Tswana schooled in a more ascetic Protestantism, the hordes that pack the storefront in hope and curiosity are being lured by the devil; this notwithstanding his ostentatious denunciation. Others are less sure, however. With the radical reorientation of local occult economies and the violence of abstractioncontours of desire and despair, of wealth and inequality, the diabolical has been invested with provocative and ambiguous powers. Its intervention into everyday life is hotly debated. We were ourselves witness to an intriguing argument among history graduate students at the University of the Northwest: is the Universal Church the work of the Antichrist or a vindication of Max Weber?58 To be sure, if Satan did not exist, crusading Christianity would have had to invent him: in order to assume its global mandate, neo-Pentecostalism summons up, perhaps as a condition of its possibility, a worthy, world-endangering antagonist to conquer. Like the Universal Church-which, by contrast to most other denominations, conducts much of its proceedings in English-Satanism i s a globalizing discourse: "The devil and his demons," says its page on the worldwide web (see n. 57), "have been deceiving people all over the world."
Remember, in this respect, the television programs mentioned earlier, the ones in which "reformed" devil worshippers spoke to callers. When asked to explain the relationship of the diabolical to boloi (witchcraft), one laconic young man said, in a fluent mix of Setswana and English: "Satanism i s high-octane witchcraft. It i s more i n t e r n a t i~n a l . "~~ So it is that old ideas are extended and novel tropes domesticated to meet altered condition^.^^ Satanists, significantly, were said predominantly to be youthful. "It i s we," offered another young ex-practitioner, "who really go for material things. We love the power of speeding around in fast cars." The devil's disciples were rumored to travel far and wide, fueling their accumulation of riches with human blood. As the "high octane" petrochemical image suggests, the basis of their potency was, again, the capacity to "ride the tiger of time-space compression" (Harvey 1990:351) : to move seamlessly between the parochial and the translocal-here and there, then and now-thus to weave the connections of cause-and-effect that hold the key to the mysteries of this new, postcolonial epoch.
IV.
Perhaps the overriding irony of the contemporary age-the Age of Futilitarianism, we called it, in which the rampant promises of late capitalism run up against a thoroughly postmodern pessimism-is how unanticipated it was. None of the grand narratives of the orthodox social sciences came anywhere near predicting the sudden transformation of the 20th-century international order, the fall of the Soviet Union, the crisis of the nation-state, the deterritorialization of culture and society, the ascendance of an unevenly regulated global economy. The surprising recent past of South Africa is one instance of this irony, one refraction of this world-historical process. Here too, notwithstanding an intense struggle, the end came unexpectedly.
Apartheid might not have ended in a bloodbath or in a race war, but the birth of the "new" nation has nonetheless been tempestuous. Most perplexing, to many, i s the apparently postpolitical character of the turbulence. Violence, by common agreement, i s epidemic (cf. Adam etal. 1998); it i s widely said to be throttling theembryonic democracy. Almost none of it, though, i s clothed in an ideological agenda, a social vision, a political program. Not yet. Which is why, perhaps, it is traumatizing the populace at large. The new nightmare is of street terror run amok; of a state in retreat; of crime as routinized redistribution; of police unwilling to protect ordinary citizens, preferring to profit from the privatization of force and the sale of arms; of "faction fights" that, having outrun their original bipartisan logic, take on a ferocious life of their own; of a new topography of public space marked by few zones of safety and many of danger; of gated communities and razor-fenced houses; of uncivil cityscapes viciously contested by youth gangs, Islamic vigilantes, drug dealers, car-jackers, and other distinctly unromantic social bandits; of an economy, as much underground as above board, in which "new" black bureaucrats and businessmen, politicians, celebrities, and criminals, grow rich while the rest struggle to s u~i v e .~'
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This, we stress, is a popular nightmare, a fast materializing mythos for the postrevolutionary moment. Sociological reality, as always, is much more complex, much less coherent. Not all i s apocalypse. Nor does everyone participate in the scare scenario. In the wake of apartheid, all sorts of legitimate new ventures prosper alongside older ones. From the quiet backyards of rural homesteads through the teeming taxi ranks of large "townships" to sedate urban corporate quarters, inventive African entrepreneurs "do business." Postcolonial commerce ruptures and dissolves long-standing racial lines in its millennia1 pursuit of virgin markets. And many whites continue to live in great physical comfort. A politics of optimism is actively purveyed by the ANC, not altogether in vain; refreshingly, the broadcast media envisagea future in which black i s not bleak. What is more, some forms of cultural production-ften exhilaratingly experimental, spirited, intense-thrive just off the most mean streets. Still, the fright nightmare persists. Indeed, it grows increasingly baroque, medieval almost, as it i s represented with ever greater facticity, ever greater statistical certainty.'* Reports of escalating witchcraft and ritual murder, of zombies and Satanism, must be situated on this restless terrain. The specter of mystical violence run wild i s a caricature of postapartheid "liberty": the liberty to transgress and consume in an unfettered world of desire, cut loose from former political, spatial, moral, sexual, and material constraints. Socialist imaginings, like all utopian ideas for a new society, falter. In their place reigns the rhetoric of the market, of freedom as the right to exercise choice through spending or voting or whatever, of personhood as constructed largely through consumption. Talk in the public sphere about violence-in official commissions and the press, on television talk shows and in "people's" courts, in artistic representation and radio debate--expresses a pent up lust for the things that apartheid denied, from iconic objects (notably, the BMW) and an omnivorous sexuality unbound by Calvinist stricture, to extravagant self-fashionings and the flamboyant sense of independence communicated by the cell phone. But it also evokes a world in which ends far outstrip means, in which the will to consume i s not matched by the opportunity to earn, in which there is a high velocity of exchange and a relatively low volume of production. And yet, we repeat, it i s a world in which the possibility of rapid enrichment, of amassing a fortune by largely invisible methods, i s always palpably present.
The preoccupation with the occult i s closely connected to all this. At one level, it i s about the desire to plumb the secret of those invisible means; at another, it i s concerned to stem the spread of a macabre, visceral economy founded on the violence of extraction and abstraction (1) in which the majority are kept poor by the mystical machinations of the few; ( 2 ) in which employment has dwindled because of the creation of a virtual labor force from the living dead;63 (3) in which profit depends on compressing space and time, on cannibalizing bodies, and on making production into the spectral province of people of the night; (4) in which the old are accused of aborting the natural process of social reproduction by preventing the next generation from securing the bases of its material and social existence-and youth, reciprocally, are demonized.64 The fact that none of this is truly new makes it no less significant to those for whom it has become an existential reality.
In no small part, witch hunts are instruments of social divination, dramatic discourses of discovery in the public sphere, whose unspoken object it is to yield explanations, to impress clarity on bodies and persons (cf. Appadurai 1995) . That ambiguity concerns many aspects of the "new" South Africa: the rights of citizens, the role of the state, the significance of cultural identity and of social difference, the meaning and the point of postapartheid politics, the infinitely complex articulations of race, class, and ethnicity; the legitimacy of an economic order that has sanctioned dramatic polarities of wealth and caused intense jealousy among neighbors. But, most of all, there is perplexity-in this Hobbesian universe where social and moral anchors seem to be aweigh, where everything appears at once possible and impossible-about the very nature of human subjects, about their covert appetites, about dark practices of the heart that show themselves in spectacular new fortunes and orgies of consumption.
Here, then, are the answers to our questions. It will be clear now why, in the South African postcolony, there has been such a dramatic intensification of appeals to enchantment. And why it is, in a world alleged to be filled with witches and ritual murders and zombies, that generational antagonisms loom so large. The rise of occult economies in postcolonial, postrevolutionary societies, be they in Europe or Africa, seems overdetermined. For one thing, these tend to be societies in which an optimistic faith in free enterprise encounters, for the first time, the realities of neoliberal economics: of unpredictable shifts in sites of production and the demand for labor; of the acute difficulties inherent in exercising stable control over space, time, or the flow of money; of an equivocal role for the state; of an end to old political alignments, without any clear lines, beyond pure interest, along which new ones take shape; of uncertainty surrounding the proper nature of civil society and the (post?)modern subject. Such are the corollaries ofthe riseof millennia1 capitalism as they are felt in much ofthecontemporary world (Comaroff 1996) . Perhaps they will turn out to be entirely transitory, a mere passing moment, in the long run. But this makes them no less momentous.
Which takes us to our final question, our final point. What i s the salience of our story for the present and future of the discipline, for a postcolonial anthropology of the global age?
"Globalism" and "globalization," as everyone knows, have become tropes for our times. Like all catchwords and cliches, they are cheapened by overuse and underspecification, by confusing an expansive metaphor for an explanatory term. As a result, much of what i s currently being written about them in the social sciences is Anthropology Lite, fact-free ethnography whose realities are more virtual than its virtues are real. At the same time, it i s important not to overreact, not to treat anything labeled "global" either as a feckless fashion or as a threat to the existence of a discipline traditionally concerned with the parochial-this last by dissolving all things culturally contingent and close to the ground into the great Eurocentric solvent of late capitalism. In point of fact, the processes involved in the rise of novel forms of planetary integration and compression--especially in the electronic economy, in mass communications, in flexitime flows of labor and capital, in the instantaneous circulation of signs and images, in the translocal commodification of culture, in the diasporic politics of identity--challenge us by re-presenting the most fundamental question of our craft: how do human beings construct their intimate, everyday life-worlds at the shifting intersections of here, there, elsewhere, everywhere?
This, finally, i s a problem of scale: of determining, in respect of any given ethnography-contemporary, historical, or both-the stretch of relations, concrete processes, imaginings, spatial planes commensurate to its realization. "Locality" i s not everywhere, nor for every purpose, the same thing; sometimes it i s a family, sometimes a town, sometimes a nation, sometimes a flow or a field, sometimes a continent or even the world; often it lies at the point of articulation among two or more of these things. Similarly, translocal, planentary connections and forces do not impinge equally or in like manner on all aspects of human thought, action, and interaction. In this respect, it i s important not to forget that "the local" and "the global" do not describe received empirical realities. They are analytic constructs whose heuristic utility depends entirely on the way in which they are deployed to illuminate historically specific phenomena (cf. Appadurai 1996; Gupta and Ferguson 1997a, 1997b ). Which i s why we have taken such pains here to trace the causal determinations of the occult economy in postapartheid South Africa across generations and genders, villages and provinces and regions, and a nation-state in transition-not to mention along the labile vectors of a post-Fordist, millennia1 economy.
As all this implies, there i s little to be gained any longer from avoiding the methodological challenge posed by the global moment, a strategy effected, on the part of some anthropologists, by retreating back into the local. This move i s typically rationalized by affirming, sometimes in an unreconstructed spirit of romantic neoprimitivism, the capacity of "native" cultures to remain assertively intact, determinedly different, in the face of a triumphal, homogenizing world capitalism. Apart from being empirically questionable, this depends upon an anachronistic, ahistorical idea of culture. O f culture transfixed in opposition to capitalism-as if capitalism were not itself cultural to the core, everywhere indigenized as if culture has not been long commodified under the impact of the market. In any case, to reduce the history of the here and now to a contest between the parochial and the universal, between sameness and distinction, i s to reinscribe the very dualism on which the colonizing discourse of early modernist social science was erected. It i s also to misrepresent the hybrid, dialectical, historically evanescent character of all contemporary social designs.
Here lies one future for anthropology, at least as the discipline looks from the vantage of the South African postcolony. It i s to interrogate the production, in imaginative and material practice, of those compound political, economic, and cultural forms by means of which human beings createcommunity and locality and identity, especially on evanescent terrains; by means of which, in the face of material and moral constraint, they fabricate social realities and power relations and impose themselves on their lived environments; by means of which space and time are made and remade, and the boundaries of the local and the global are actualized. Observe the stress on the active voice: from this perspective, the epistemic objects of our inquiry are no longer nouns-culture, society, institutions, or whatever-but compound verbs describing the construction and deconstruction of more-or-less stable practices, conventions, forms, commodities, abstractions. Even the most overdetermined, most complex, most inchoate of world-historical forces-colonialism, the global market, cyberspace, "late" capitalism-take shape in sociocultural processes that inhabit particular places during particular periods in particular persons (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992) . Without human agents, without specified locations and moments and actions, realities are not realized, nothing takes place, the present has no presence.
These locations and moments, people and practices-to return one last time to the spirit of Max Gluckman-comprise the fragments from which an anthropology of millennia1 capitalism and the culture of neoliberalism is to be constructed: the fragments from which we may recuperate the mechanisms by which the local i s globalized and the global localized. For in these processes lies an explanation for the most parochial of things, like the "new" occult economy in South Africa, also for the most universal. Like the fact that enchantment, far from slipping away with the resolute march of modernity, seems everywhere on the rise.
notes
Northwest Province, as we observed in August 1997, orchestrated witch finding tends to occur primarily in remote rural areas-such as those south of Taung and in the northeast Hurutshe district-which are quite far from the urban hub of Mafikeng-Mmabatho. We are grateful to Neil Roos of the Department of History, University of the Northwest (personal communication, December 16, 19971, whose insights on this pattern confirm our own.
44. See "Outcasts of the Witch Village of the North," Weekly Mail and Guardian, November 3, 1995. 45. Ritchken observes that, in Mapulaneng, males who did not find jobs, either at home or as migrant workers, were liable to be called "women" (1994:344, 375) . W e found much the same thing in the Northwest. The recessions of the 1980s and 1990s, which seriously reduced the access of young men to employment, and to female partners, seems to have exacerbated their feminization in many parts of the country.
46. The popular and prestigious Standard Bank National Arts Festival in Grahamstown featured a play entitled Zombie, by Brett Bailey, on July 4-14, 1996 . The events on which it was based are remarkably similar to those reported in the fourth of our opening fragments: they began with a taxi van accident in Kokstad in which 12 schoolboys were killed, and they ended with the murder of two elderly "witches" by comrades of the deceased. The appearance of this play on such a prominent stage suggests that the phenomenon itself is entering into the mainstream of public consciousness. W e are grateful to Loren Kruger, of the Department of English at the University of Chicago, for sharing with us a review of the production.
47. Unlike the cases reported by Geschiere (in press), there is little evidence that zombies here are created by the sacrifice of close kin, although it seems largely to have been the immediate relatives of missing persons who voiced suspicions about their having been made into phantom workers. The one exception of which we are aware is the story, published in the WallStreetJournal, quoted in n. 39 above.
48. See "Spirits Strike at Labour Relations," Weekly M a i l and Guardian, December 27, 1995. 49. Geschiere suggests that the rise of zombie-like beliefs in Cameroon implies that "witches see their fellow men no longer as meat to be eaten . . . as life to feed upon in order to strengthen one's own life force-but rather as laborers that have to be exploited" (in press). This shift is not born out in the South African material. Mounting evidence of a market in human body parts indicates that faith in the productive power of immoral consumption has strengthened along with other dimensions of the occult economy. Whereas most Africans insist that whites neither practice witchcraft nor are susceptible to it (Ralushai et al. 1996 :23)-which may or may not be true-there has long been evidence (as in the case of the blue eyes, mentioned above) that their bodies are especially effective sources of strengthening substances. 50. See, for example, "The Human Parts that Heal," Vusi Khoza and Annie Mapoma, Weekly Mail and Guardian, December 9, 1994 . This is a preference attributed, speculatively, to ritual murderers and their putative clients. It derives largely from the "fact" that many victims of homicides alleged to have been committed for the culling of body parts have been young children. W e have ourselves heard such speculations on countless occasions.
51. These were the given prices at the end of 1994; see "The Human Parts that Heal," Vusi Khoza and Annie Mapoma, Weekly M a i l and Guardian, December 9, 1994 . According to the Johannesburg Star, mentioned in the fourth of our opening fragments (and annotated in n. 11 1, the eyes ofwhitechildren fetched $700 in April 1996. 52. See, again, "The Human Parts that Heal," Vusi Khoza and Annie Mapoma, Weekly Mail and Guardian, December 9, 1994. 53. One of these cases, cited above (n. 12), was heard in the Bisho Supreme Court; see Wright 1996 . The other is State vs. Edward Nkhumeleni and Others, Venda Supreme Court, case no. CC17194, February 1995. 54. Dissatisfaction with the investigation into a clutch of murders in the territory led to protest on the part of the Northern Transvaal ANC Youth Congress, which organized stay-aways and a boycott of schools and local stores (Ralushai et al. 1996:257) . A local businessman, a former official of the Venda homeland government, and a ritual practitioner were finally convicted in these cases.
55. Another incident occurred in 1997 in Mmankgodi (population 4,000), just outside Gaborone. After a five-year-old girl disappeared, presumed to have fallen victim to ritual murder, "a mob of riotous youths . . . went on the rampage, burning almost all government buildings in the village" (Durham 1998 :1, from the Botswana Gazette, April 16, 1997). As in the earlier case, this was followed by demonstrations involving students at the University of Botswana, who demanded that government take steps to prevent such attacks.
56. Also in white South Africa, where rising fears of the diabolical are part and parcel of an apocalyptic vision of the world after apartheid-and where the Occult-related Crime Unit of the Police Service, mentioned above (Ralushai et al. 1996 ; n. 281, wages "valiant battle" against "Satanic subcultures" said to be rampant among white teenagers; see "Donker Jonker's Righteous Crusade," Weekly M a i l and Guardian, October 6, 1995. 57. The genealogy of the church can be traced back to the Pentecostal revival of the 1950s and 1960s in Brazil, and to the ideas of such proponents of the American "Prosperity Gospel" as Kenneth Hagin. For details, see Eric Kramer 1994 , to whom we are grateful for sharing his extensive knowledge of this religious movement. See also the web page of the Universal Church in South Africa (http://www.surfnet.co.ra/stop.suffering) In hypertext, under Financial Testimonies, it carries a story entitled "BMW and Business," in which one Lorraine Maila recalls how, by joining the denomination, and by "making a chain of prayersu--echoes of the chain letter?-she "was blessed with a BMW 31 6 Dolphin and brand new equipment in [her] shop." By way of comparison with the religion closer to home, there is, in
